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Abstract
The role of religion in American politics and civil society has drawn significant scholarly focus,
but most of the recent attention has fallen on the religious right’s political influence and, more
recently, on new initiatives to broaden the channeling of social service funding through faithbased organizations. These are important issues, but they exclude another historically important
face of religiously-grounded public engagement: religious pressure for deeper political and
economic democracy. We examine a widespread contemporary aspect of such engagement,
faith-based community organizing (FBCO), through which poor and middle-income religious
congregations advance the interests of their members. We analyze data from the first national
study of faith-based organizing and link that analysis to recent theoretical work on civil society
and the public realm to argue that FBCO makes a distinctive contribution to contemporary
democracy by forging “bridging social capital” and creating “bridging institutions” that link the
civic, political, and state levels of the public sphere.

A Different Face of Faith-Based Politics:
Social Capital and Community Organizing in the Public Arena

I. Introduction
The growing efforts of religious communities to pursue political goals has sharpened
scholarly attention to the role of religion in the public realm (Wald 1992; Casanova 1994;
Williams 1999). In the United States, much of this attention has focused on the religious right,
which has proven capable of bringing people into active political participation (see Wilcox 2000,
for an overview of this voluminous literature), but has often been intolerant of legitimate
pluralism in public life. Yet historically religious activism has frequently undergirded political
causes seen as progressive, and has often introduced greater pluralism in the political arena (for
example, see Morris 1984 on the civil rights movement; Baggett 2000 on religion and lowincome housing; C. Smith 1996a on the peace movement and 1996b on progressive religion
generally). The new tenor and changing forms of religiously-based political participation raise
important questions about the role of faith communities in public life:1 Can religious
communities organized around particularistic and sometimes sectarian beliefs collaborate
constructively and effectively in the public sphere – particularly when the latter incorporates
contrasting faith communities and is organized around secular institutions? Can they do so in
ways that are broadly-enough organized to strengthen democratic strands in American politics?
These questions have recently gained further urgency in the United States as a result of
efforts to redirect some federal funding of social service programs through religious institutions.
As this "faith-based initiative" has moved forward, it has heightened scholarly attention to the
role of churches and other religious institutions as service providers and more broadly as centers
for renewal in poor communities (Cnaan 1999; DiIulio 1997; Thomas and Blake 1996).
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In contrast both to recent activism by religious conservatives and to faith-based social
service provision, this paper focuses on a quite distinct religious intervention in civil society.
Rather than provide services, in this kind of intervention, known as faith-based community
organizing (FBCO), religious communities seek to empower their members to pursue political
goals in the public sphere. Moreover, these organizations tend to pursue goals congruent with the
economic interests of their mostly urban, low-to-middle income, and racially diverse
participants. This paper documents the emergence of FBCO as a national phenomenon in
American public life, and analyzes the implications of that emergence for democracy in
America. We show that faith-based community organizing represents one of the broadest based
initiatives in the American public sphere, and that it addresses two fundamental weaknesses of
our contemporary polity (see following section).
FBCO refers to a model of locally based organizing that engages people primarily
through their membership in religious congregations and trains them for leadership on behalf of
their communities. To a smaller but significant extent, the organizations have incorporated
participation by non-faith institutions such as unions, schools, neighborhood organizations, and
an array of other community-based organizations – either through direct membership or looser
collaboration in pursuit of shared issue agendas. These agendas are often quite broad in their
efforts to improve the quality of life for families in low-income communities, including living
wage campaigns, public works projects, affordable housing, school reform, job training, health
care, and public safety.
A growing number of case studies of FBCO networks and organizations argue that these
groups make particularly important contributions to the revitalization of American democratic
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life. They show how FBCO groups foster broad participation and leadership of those often
excluded from politics and project this organized power into the public arena (Warren 1998,
2001; Wood 1999, 2002; Rooney 1995; Shirley 1997; McRoberts 2000; Hart 2001). These
studies have portrayed how particular FBCO groups and networks work and what they
accomplish. However, until now, it has been impossible to gauge the actual and potential
democratic impact the faith-based organizing field as a whole. This paper reports the findings of
the first national survey of the FBCO field (Warren and Wood 2001), which allows us to
measure more precisely the size and scope of the field – and thus to assess its contributions as a
national phenomenon in American public life.

II. Social Capital and the Public Sphere
To more sharply analyze the contributions and limitations of faith-based political
organizing, we draw primarily on the concepts of “social capital” and “the public sphere.” Both
concepts have been the object of extensive scholarly debate in recent years, with contested
meanings and divergent positions having emerged from these debates. We do not attempt to
settle these disputes here, but rather to draw on this literature to construct an analytic framework
for assessing the work of FBCO. For a sample of the extensive social capital literature and its
critics, see (Putnam 2000; Foley and Edwards 1997; Edwards and Foley 1998; Portes 1998;
Warren, Thompson, and Saegert 2001); on the public sphere, see (Habermas 1984; Habermas
1989; Calhoun 1992; Cohen and Arato1992).

Social capital:
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By social capital, we refer to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam 1995: 67).
These kinds of social connections provide a foundation for political democracy in several ways.
First, it is through such ties that people develop a sense of commonality and a concern for each
other. Moreover, skills developed in social institutions and habits of cooperation cultivated there
can translate to the political arena. Equally important, whereas individuals stand powerless
against large-scale economic and political institutions, in association, they have the opportunity
to generate power in pursuit of common interests; social capital reserves allow the individuals
thus connected to act on their shared interests.
The nature of social capital and its trends in the United States have been a controversial
subject (see, for example, Putnam 2000; Portes 1998; Edwards and Foley 1998). Nevertheless,
scholars have usefully contrast two types of social capital: bonding and bridging (see especially
Warren, Thompson and Saegert 2001; Gittell and Vidal 1998). Bonding social capital refers to
connections among people who are like each other regarding some relevant dimension of social
life; it can be thought of as within-community social ties. Bridging social capital refers to
connections across communities, ties among those who are different along a relevant dimension
of social life.
Relatively homogeneous communities may be more or less well-organized internally, but
what appears often missing in American social and political life is much of a bridge across
communities. Interracial bridging social capital is particularly in short supply. Our
neighborhoods continue to be highly segregated by race (Massey and Denton 1993) and class
(Jargowsky 1997). Despite efforts at integration, the level of racial segregation in our schools is
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actually increasing (Orfield and Eaton 1996). Internally, churches remain highly divided by race.
And evidence from the Gallup polls suggest that social clubs and churches are even more
segregated than neighborhoods and schools (reported in Putnam 2000, p. 357-8). Interest groups
appear to remain largely divided by race as well, with a definite skew in membership towards the
affluent.
The contributions of social capital to American democracy are quite limited by these
divisions. If people tend to connect only with those like themselves, then there is much less
opportunity for developing broader social identities, a conception of the common good, or shared
strategies for promoting an economic or political agenda serving the interests of the majority. In
this context, we seek to examine the role of FBCO in forging bridging ties across communities
and among institutional sectors in civil society.

Public sphere:
For present purposes, we may think of the public sphere as made up of all those arenas of
social life in which members of a community and their representatives in roles of institutional
leadership reflect upon, argue about, and make decisions regarding the problems they face and
the rules under which they live (Habermas 1989; Calhoun 1992; Cohen 1992). For analytic
purposes, the public sphere can be divided into three levels. The first level is the state, that is, all
those government settings (from local to national) in which elected representatives make the
formal laws that govern societal life. These settings include the legislative process in city
councils, schools boards, state legislatures, and Congress; judicial review at all levels; and
executive policy formulation by mayors, governors, and presidents and their aides. Especially to
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the extent that decisions in these government settings are made in ways not purely technocratic
but involving deliberation through dialogue with constituencies, they are key components of the
public sphere.
But the public sphere also includes far more than government. Indeed, the most crucial
dynamics for long-term political change arguably do not lie within government at all, but in the
formation of political will and aggregation of interests among both the general citizenry and
leaders of non-governmental institutions in society.
This second level of the public sphere has been termed “political society,” to denote all
those arenas lying outside government but loosely linked to it (Stepan 1988; Casanova 1994).
Most notably, political society includes political parties, lobbyists and political action
committees, labor unions and business associations, “think tanks” associated with interest
groups, and similar organizations with directly political goals. Within political society, citizen
demands are channeled and possible responses are formulated. As the reach of government into
society has lengthened, and the number and diversity of issues facing governments have
broadened, political society has gained a central role in policy formulation. But the relative
weight of different actors within political society has also shifted. Political parties, once fairly
robust channels of popular participation, are now largely organizational shells for raising the vast
sums of money needed for electoral campaigns. Labor unions still play significant political roles
but are much weaker than they were two decades ago, despite recent reinvigoration. In contrast,
the roles of business associations, policy institutions, and political action committees have grown
considerably (Pomper 1992; Aldrich 1995; Coleman 1996; Wattenberg 1998; White and Davies
1998).
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The third level of the public sphere is “civil society”: all those organizational settings that
are not part of government or political society, but in which the values and attitudes of societal
members are shaped. Such politically-relevant socialization occurs in myriad settings throughout
society – civic groups, political discussion groups, issue study groups, ethnic associations, and
churches, to name only a few. The concept of civil society provides a way of understanding how
the associational life of voluntary groups helps form political identities, shape political attitudes,
and generate the solidarities that underlie political mobilization.2
The public sphere can thus be understood analytically as constituted at three levels of
social life: the "state," made up of deliberative governmental settings; "political society," made
up of non-governmental individuals and organizational political actors that seek to intervene
directly in government; and "civil society," made up of organizational settings in which
politically-relevant but not always directly political conversations occur. More accurately, the
public sphere is a potential space lying across these three societal levels, a space which must
constantly be reconstituted by people and groups actually engaging in public deliberation. That
is, public life must be regularly re-enacted; otherwise it withers. Democratic theorists argue that
only when this occurs vigorously through many levels of society does democracy flourish and
does democratic decision-making really guide societal direction (cf. Cohen and Arato 1992).
The public sphere is a useful analytical construct, but it obscures a crucial fact: the three
levels of the public realm exist in rather different organizational spaces: in government; in
political associations like parties, unions, political action and lobbying groups; and in civic
associations. Linking them analytically does not suffice to make the public realm an effective
arena for societal deliberation. There must exist institutional linkages to facilitate
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communication across these three levels. Political parties and labor unions have historically
provided the institutional means for linking political society downward into civil society (via
their roots in ethnic associations, business groups, workplaces, families, etc) and upward into the
state (through electoral influence and the exercise of political power). But political parties’
downward linkages have weakened considerably in recent decades, replaced by new
technologies of opinion surveys, mass marketing, and fundraising through direct mail (Coleman
1996; Aldrich 1995; Pomper 1992), and labor unions – despite recent strengthening – represent a
small portion of private-sector employees (Voss and Sherman 2000).
Public sphere theorists are criticized for assuming a single idealized public and failing to
pay sufficient attention to how power dynamics within the public sphere coopt or undermine
challenger groups. In response, Fraser (1992) has constructed a more radical understanding
under the rubric of “subaltern counterpublics” – i.e. the promotion of multiple smaller public
spheres within which subaltern groups engage in counterhegemonic discourse. Yet Fraser’s
position begs the question: To what extent do such subaltern counterpublics actually promote the
deepening of democratic life for a national society as a whole, as opposed to isolating subaltern
groups without giving them any real impact on democratic life?
In order to avoid idealized assumptions of a single polity and, simultaneously, to insist on
asking whether counterpublics actually deepen democratic dynamics in the broader society, we
see the public sphere as both a conflictive and collaborative arena, in which groups both compete
for influence and also forge understandings of a common good – or, at least, a shared societal
future. The ability of any subaltern counterpublic to influence the broader polity will vary. This
study suggests a specific counterpublic’s contribution to democratic life will depend partly on
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the extent to which it is located within institutions that bridge the gap between levels of the
public sphere (and thus bridge the divide between subaltern groups and hegemonic elites,
whether opponents or potential allies).
Without such bridges communities within civil society can be either passively isolated
from the flow of communication in political society and the state, or actively colonized by
political and economic forces utilizing these new technologies. In either case, these anemic or
colonizing downward linkages erode democracy in America by making political parties – and
through them, elected officials – less exposed to democratic pressure from below. We term this
the structural fragmentation of the public sphere. One goal of this report is to examine the extent
to which faith-based organizing bridges the institutional gap between civil society and the other
two levels of the public sphere, and therefore offers at least a partial antidote to this
fragmentation.

III. The Faith-Based Organizing Model
FBCO finds its roots in the model for community organizing created by Saul Alinsky
during his work in Chicago’s stockyard neighborhoods in the 1930s (Horwitt 1989). The harddriving style of organizing that characterized Alinsky’s work was often effective, especially in
its early decades, but Alinsky never succeeded in building stable organizations that remained
focused on a progressive organizing agenda. In the early 1970s, initially in San Antonio, Texas
and subsequently in many sites around the country, organizers began much more systematically
developing ties to religious cultural expressions within poor communities and treating religious
congregations as the key institutional foundation for building their organizations (Warren 2001
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and Hart 2001 for discussions of this history). Under this faith-based model of community
organizing, groups developed stable foundations and their numbers began to increase.
By the late 1990s, it was possible to identify a nation-wide field of faith-based
community organizing, present in most metropolitan areas around the country. Most of these
organizations are affiliated with one of several organizing networks: the Industrial Areas
Foundation (IAF, representing about a third of the organizations); the Pacific Institute for
Community Organization (PICO) and the Gamaliel Network (each representing about 20% of
the organizations); Direct Action, Research, and Training (DART, 15% of the organizations);
and a smaller number of organizations operating independently or with the RCNO network in
southern California. We use the term faith-based community organizing as the best way to
describe the type of organizing conducted by all the groups in the field, although other
descriptors like congregational or broad-based organizing are sometimes used by participants.
Warren (2001) and Jacobsen (2001) have termed the resulting fusion of faith and politics a
“theology of organizing,” while Wood (2002, chapter 2) stresses that faith-based organizing –
when practiced well – creates a symbiosis between religious culture and political organizing
which “allows churches to make their ethical and democratic values active in the public realm,
without undermining the moral community that sustains those values.”
FBCO groups share a common set of characteristics that make them distinctive, as
follows.
•

Faith-based: The membership of faith-based community organizations are drawn
primarily from religious congregations. FBCO groups strive explicitly to ground their
organizing in the values and traditions that come from religious faith.

•

Broad-based: FBCO groups strive to be inclusive of the diversity of communities that
make up their local organizing area. They are typically ecumenical (incorporating a
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variety of Christian congregations) or interfaith (incorporating non-Christian
congregations as well), and many include in their membership schools, unions and a
variety of other community-based institutions like neighborhood associations. To varying
extents, they bring community leaders together across lines of race, income, and gender.
•

Locally constituted: FBCO groups conduct their organizing in areas that range from large
neighborhoods to entire metropolitan areas. Although these groups are linked into the
national and regional networks discussed above, their emphasis remains on local
organizing.

•

Multi-issue: The organizations are explicitly multi-issue. Their purpose is to train local
leaders in how to effectively address pressing issues facing their communities, as the
leaders themselves determine them (in consultation with each other and with organizers).

•

Staffed by professional organizers: FBCO groups hire professional organizers whose
main responsibility is the recruitment and training of local leaders. The leaders
themselves work with the organizations on a voluntary basis. Using a relational
organizing approach, organizers teach people how to build relationships with each other
within and across their institutions as a basis for public action.

•

Political, but nonpartisan: FBCO groups seek to exert power in the public arena based
upon the strength of these relationships and their member institutions. The groups are
usually incorporated as nonprofit 501-C(3) or 501-C(4) organizations.

Although FBCO groups are locally constituted, the networks mentioned above play key
roles in the development of the field. They structure leadership training, typically coordinate
staff development, and seek to launch new projects. Many networks increasingly attempt to
coordinate strategy at state and regional levels. In fact, local organizations have worked together
in their networks to pursue state level campaigns in such places as Texas, California, Louisiana,
Arizona, Maryland, Florida, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Colorado.

Data and Methods:
The rest of this paper draws upon the findings of a national survey of all local faith-based
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community organizing groups active in the United States (Warren and Wood 2001).3 The
research project sought to identify all local organizations in the country that followed the FBCO
model above and were functioning in 1999 – that is, had an office and a paid organizer on staff.
Projects that were still at an early stage of development or ones that had languished into
inactivity were not included in the survey.
Using these criteria, researchers identified 133 organizations that were operating in the
FBCO field in 1999. Typically the most senior paid organizer on the staff of the organization
collected the information necessary to answer the survey questions. Questionnaires were
completed via telephone interviews; in most cases, organizers also faxed information to the
interviewer, including lists of member institutions and members of the governing boards, and
demographic data on the local community. In open-ended questions, respondents were asked
about their organizations’ participation in broader networks and partnerships of various kinds,
but state, regional and national FBCO organizations were not directly surveyed. Interfaith
Funders adopted a confidentiality policy that no findings would be reported that could identify
any particular organization or network, or its characteristics; this paper adheres to that policy.
We draw on both the quantitative and qualitative response data for this analysis.
Of the 133 organizations constituting the universe of the FBCO field, 100 responded to
the survey, a response rate of 75%. In an effort to extrapolate the results from this survey to
reflect patterns in the entire field, a weight was created as the ratio of potential respondents to
actual respondents, specific to network affiliation. In general, applying such a weight has the
effect of increasing the number of cases with data to equal that in the universe. However, using
such a weight requires the assumption that the non-respondents are similar to the respondents.
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This is a reasonable assumption, but not a perfect one. One particular source of response bias lies
in the fact that a number of organizations in the New York/New Jersey area did not participate in
this survey. Therefore, their potentially distinct characteristics and experience are not well
represented in our description of the field.

IV. A National Phenomenon
Results from the survey suggest that faith-based community organizing is a now a
national phenomenon with a broad reach into American congregations and communities. The
FBCO field incorporates a large number of institutions, as about 4,000 institutions are official
members of the organizations in the field. Of these, about 3,500 (or 87.5%) are religious
congregations, while 500 (or 12.5%) are non-congregational institutions like unions, schools and
other community organizations.4
The 133 identified organizations in the FBCO field are active in most states across the
country: Thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have at least one local faith-based
organization. Six states incorporate half of all of the organizations; these states are
geographically dispersed and represent most of the crucial electoral battlegrounds nationally.
The states with the highest numbers are California (19), Texas (11), New York (11), Florida
(10), Illinois (8) and Ohio (8).5 The regional distribution is given in Table 1 which also provides
mean descriptors for organizations in the field. Table 2 provides a more detailed breakdown.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
The FBCO field is composed of organizations that are fairly young. The average
founding date for faith-based organizations in existence in 1999 (measured as the year a group
hired a professional organizer) is 1991. Of the FBCO groups operating in 1999, 41% were
founded after 1994 and 71% were founded since 1990.
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The relative youth of FBCO groups suggest the field is growing fairly rapidly. Of course,
older organizations may have folded, but qualitative studies (e.g. Warren 2001) find that FBCO
groups take a while to form, and then tend to persist, suggesting that the field has a relatively low
attrition rate. Moreover, a study conducted in 1994 (Hart 2001) identified 90 groups in operation
at that time, so the field has grown by nearly 50% since then.
FBCO groups vary considerably in size. The average faith-based community organization
has 30 institutional members. Some are fairly small, with 37% having less than 20 institutional
members. About half have between 20 and 40 institutional members. Others are quite large; 11%
have between 40 and 69 members, while a few have over 100. The largest has 230 member
institutions.
Some sense for the relative significance of this field can be gained from some historical
comparison. The 3,500 congregations active in FBCO comprise between 1 and 1.5% of all
congregations in the country.6 Depending on how we estimate the numbers of people who are
members of these congregations, the FBCO field reaches between 1 and 3 million people.7
Scholars who have studied civic participation throughout American history note that very few
organizations have ever incorporated more than 1% of Americans into their membership
(Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000).8 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that FBCO has
achieved a significant size and a broad reach into American communities.
The descriptive data offered so far show that FBCO is now a national phenomenon, is
growing considerably at present, and represents a political presence within the American polity
that in quantitative terms is historically significant. In the following two sections, we consider
more analytically the role FBCO plays within the American polity: first FBCO’s impact on
social capital, then its role within the public sphere.
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V. The Bridging Ties of FBCO
Early faith-based organizing efforts often took place in rather homogenous racial
communities, whether made up of ethnic whites in Chicago in the 1950s or Hispanic Catholics in
San Antonio in the 1970s. Today, such FBCO groups composed of a single denominational or
racial group are highly atypical. In this section, we report what the survey reveals about the
diversity of institutions in the FBCO field, as well as about the diversity that exists within
particular organizations – that is, we report on the extent to which FBCO fosters bridging social
capital.

Bridging social capital across religious groupings
The survey reveals that, nationally, the FBCO field bridges religious institutions across
three main categories: Roman Catholics, mainline Protestants and historic Black Protestants. As
Table 3 shows, Catholics make up about 33% of the congregations. A variety of mainline
Protestant denominations make up another third of the congregations in membership, including
(in order of concentration from highest to lowest) United Methodists, Lutherans, Episcopalians,
Presbyterians, and Congregationalists (UCC). Baptists (including Missionary) hold about a 16%
share. From our observations of the field, as well as other reports, we surmise that the Baptists
are largely black. If we include the Methodist Episcopal and Other Black Protestant group with
Baptists, then historic black Protestant denominations hold about a 20% share. There is some
wider religious presence as well, with Jewish, Unitarian-Universalist, and black evangelical
(mostly Church of God in Christ) congregations each constituting about a 2% share of the total.
[Table 3 about here]
To assess the extent to which FBCO promotes interfaith ties at the local level, we divided
the 93 respondent organizations in the survey that supplied data on this question into categories
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based on the proportion of member congregations from the following religious groups: Catholic,
historic black Protestant, mainline (liberal and moderate) Protestant, traditionalist Protestant
(many Pentecostal, including COGIC), and non-Christian (mostly Jewish and Unitarian, with a
few Muslim and other congregations).9 Table 4 shows the religious diversity within the 93
respondent organizations, grouped according to their religious homogeneity or diversity.
[Table 4 about here]

The table shows that the large majority of FBCO groups bring at least two, if not three,
major religious groupings together at the local level. There is a modest degree of wider religious
diversity beyond Catholic/Mainline Protestant/Black Protestant participation as well. In 20 of the
93 organizations at least 9% of FBCO member congregations were non-Christian; and in 12 of
the 93 organizations at least 9% of FBCO member congregations were traditionalist Protestant
(in 3 of these 12, most of the churches were COGIC congregations, a predominantly black
denomination).
Thus, the strong religious diversity of faith-based organizing on the national level largely
holds up on the local level: FBCO promotes widespread ecumenical and interfaith ties within its
primary arena of activity, the citywide and metropolitan public sphere.

Religious absence:
Returning to a discussion of the FBCO field as a whole, the survey also reveals who is
not participating at significant levels in this phenomenon (see Table 3). White evangelicals and
fundamentalists are noticeably absent, especially considering their prominence in American
society. A cluster of theologically conservative Protestant denominations (including, for
example, Assembly of God, Nazarene, Apostolic and Wesleyan) constitutes less than 3% of the
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field’s congregations. Given the importance of Jewish participation in social justice efforts
historically, the 2% figure for their participation might be interpreted as low. Meanwhile, nonChristian groups other than Jewish and Unitarian-Universalists congregations constitute less than
1% of the congregations in the field; yet Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu congregations are growing
in importance in urban America (Warner and Wittner 1998).
Although largely absent as formal members, institutions in these under represented
denominations may have some connection to faith based organizing. When asked in open-ended
questions about the involvement of Jewish congregations and evangelical, Pentecostal, or
fundamentalist churches, a large number of respondents said such congregations were indeed
involved in their FBCO groups, at least to some degree. Many FBCO groups reported significant
outreach efforts to Jews, white evangelicals and non-Christians, with fully 88% reporting “some
contact” with at least one of these groups. Forty-seven percent of organizers interviewed noted
some contact with Jewish congregations and 56% noted some contact with evangelical or
Pentecostal congregations. Very few, however, claimed contact with congregations identified as
“fundamentalist.”
It is difficult to assess precisely how substantive the involvement of groups outside
formal membership may be. The language used by respondents in the open-ended questions was
often that of being “in conversation” with Jewish congregations or others in their area. Our data
do not allow us to assess how important a dialogue this may be at present, though Jewish
participation in some local areas is quite significant.
The extensive number of contacts reported with evangelical and Pentecostal Christian
churches suggests that lead organizers recognize the significance of this burgeoning sector of the
American religious spectrum. The Pentecostal and evangelical churches “in conversation” with
FBCO groups appear to be primarily African-American (especially Church of God in Christ) and
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Latino congregations, and less frequently white evangelical congregations. Many reasons might
explain the absence of white evangelicals/fundamentalists: the lack of an emphasis on action for
social justice, an aversion to interfaith collaboration, racial prejudice, and/or prior organization
into a politics of the religious right (see Warren 2001 for a more extensive discussion focused on
Southern Baptists).
Respondents noted potential benefits and significant obstacles for FBCO groups
collaborating with evangelical or Pentecostal churches, whether minority or white. Among the
benefits cited were the scriptural fluency common in these churches, the fact that they “bring lots
of diversity” to an organization, and the belief that evangelicals “are less likely [than other
church-goers] to explain away the demands of scripture if they understand those demands.”
Organizers reported that the most significant obstacle to working with these strands of
Christianity was the theological or cultural divide separating them from FBCO. They said these
churches “tend to be otherworldly,” “do not have much trust of us,” do not see this work as “part
of their definition of their mission,” or “see no need to hold systems accountable.” A few noted
that evangelicals sometimes feel marginalized by the Catholic and liberal/moderate/Black
Protestant cultures that have been central to faith-based organizing. One reported that his
organization lost some evangelical members due to the fact that other member churches accepted
gay and lesbian members or had female pastors. One organizer summed up the experience of
working with these congregations in these terms:

It takes two or three years to build trust, overcome the
distrust across interfaith lines. Evangelicals and
Pentecostals have lots of distrust about interfaith work, and
about the word 'interfaith.' Jewish congregations have
distrust of being involved in anything that seems Christiandominated. They have lots of sensitivity to the language
that's used, to the religious cultural stuff that's used. Our
approach in board meetings, task forces, committee
meetings has been to invite people to reflect and pray in
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their own faith traditions, and over time everybody gets
exposed to a little bit of various traditions. At actions, in
public actions, we ask people to use more universal
language, or we'll have three or four different faith
traditions pray at the same action.

The question of how to combine faith traditions in one organization becomes even more
pointed given the diversity of congregations represented in faith-based organizing, albeit at low
levels of participation. In addition to the religious communities discussed above, lead organizers
reported having done outreach, sought membership, or held exploratory conversations with the
following traditions (with rough counts in parenthesis): Islamic (23), Unitarian Universalist (10),
and Buddhist (8), with smaller numbers of contacts with congregations of the Adventist, African
spiritualist, Christian Science, Hindu, Mormon, Religious Science, Sikh, and Word of Faith
traditions.10

Building Bridges across Racial/Ethnic Groups and to Immigrants
The survey reveals that FBCO brings together Americans from the nation’s three largest
racial/ethnic groups, white, black and Hispanic.11 The FBCO field is quite diverse racially in its
institutional membership, with white, black and Hispanic institutions all well represented. As
revealed in Table 5, institutions whose membership is predominantly white make up 36% of all
member institutions. Predominantly black institutions comprise about 35% of institutions, with
those predominantly Hispanic about 21%. Interracial institutions, that is, those that do not have
one predominant racial/ethnic group, make up the rest with nearly 6.5% of the total. Meanwhile,
predominantly Asian-American institutions are few at only 1.3%, and Native American
institutions are virtually absent at only .02%.
If we look at the governing boards of faith-based organizations, we can also see racial
diversity (Table 5). Although the meaning of membership on governing boards does vary across
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the organizations, generally they include the most active and committed leaders of the
organization. About 43% of governing board members are white, 32% are black, and 21% are
Hispanic. However, only 2% are Asian and Native Americans are largely absent.
[Table 5 about here]
But, as with religious diversity, we also analyze the racial composition of groups within
the field. This second measure of diversity is critical because, although FBCO is a national
phenomenon, it does not operate as a unified field. The primary locus of political action in
FBCO is local, and so it is important to know whether it bridges sectors within the local arena, or
only in the aggregate.
If we examine the racial composition of the FBCO groups within the field (Table 6), we
find that, by and large, FBCO groups do work to forge multiracial ties within their local political
arenas. Only 9 out of the 82 groups with valid data on that question (11%) are monoracial, that
is, composed entirely of institutions whose membership is predominantly of one racial/ethnic
group. Another 4 (5%) have one racial group in strong dominance, that is, more than 80% of the
institutions are in one group; these are divided between white-dominated and black-dominated
organizations. About one quarter of all FBCO groups (21) organize interracially to a significant
extent, but with one racial group in a strong majority (65-80% of member institutions); in twothirds of these cases, the majority group is white. The 48 remaining FBCO groups (59%) are
racially diverse. Most (35) are essentially biracial, while 11 are at least triracial.
[Table 6 about here]
The FBCO field also works to incorporate a significant number of immigrant
communities. As reported in Table 5 almost 11% of all institutions that are members of FBCO
are predominantly immigrant in composition. Of those immigrant institutions, 57% are Hispanic,
17% white, 15% black, 6% Asian and 3% interracial. When asked about their outreach to
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immigrants, 50% of organizers responding to the survey reported work with immigrant
communities; this suggests that, at least in some cities, faith-based organizing has recognized the
importance of the vast influx of new immigrants that has occurred in recent years. Recipients of
this outreach are primarily Mexican, but a remarkable array of specific populations were
mentioned in the interviews, including Brazilians, Cambodians, Cape Verdeans, Chinese,
Filipinos, Guatemalans, Haitians, Hmong, Koreans, Liberians, Polish, Portuguese, Russians,
Salvadorans, and Vietnamese. Religious congregations are the dominant conduit for this work.
But FBCO groups also reach immigrants through their work in public schools and in
collaborative efforts with migrant labor communities, day laborer co-ops, ethnic associations,
and labor unions. It is hard, however, to determine from this data how significant the latter forms
of outreach may be.
It appears that some of the more innovative work in the field is dedicated to reaching
immigrants. This includes one network that offers a separate introductory national training in
Spanish, and a few local organizations with initiatives focused on immigrants. According to one
respondent:
We are placing considerable emphasis on organizing Mexican immigrants in our
area. These people are farm-workers or employees at a meatpacking plant.... [who
we reach through] three Roman Catholic parishes that are members. These
immigrants have been recruited to attend [our faith-based organizing network’s]
four-day training for Spanish speakers. One church sent five of its immigrant
leaders to training.
Our organization has created a separate organizing track to reach immigrants.
[We do this] as an empowerment step, followed by bringing these immigrant
leaders together with second and third generation Hispanic leaders. This process
has been necessary to overcome the tendency for Spanish-speaking immigrants to
drop out when meetings are dominated by English-speaking Hispanics. The goal
is to empower immigrants so they can participate on an equal basis with whites
and English-speaking Hispanics.
From this analysis we conclude that faith-based organizing appears to build social capital
that transcends the racial/ethnic boundaries that divide much of urban society in America, as
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well as those between recent migrant communities and longer-established social institutions.
We have already shown that the field has made significant gains in bridging communities across
faith/denominational lines. A final way to consider the issue of bridging social capital is to
examine newer initiatives within FBCO to incorporate a growing number of nonfaith institutions
like unions and schools into their organizations.

Faith-Nonfaith Ties
Although FBCO groups are largely composed of religious institutions, the survey reveals
their increasing ability to draw other kinds of institutions into public action. Their efforts to do
so expand the membership base of FBCO and foster new forms of public collaboration between
congregations and secular based institutions. Non-congregational institutions (NCIs) now
represent almost 13% of all member institutions in the FBCO field. Of the NCIs, schools
represent about 42% of the total nationally, unions about 15%, and neighborhood associations
nearly 7% (Table 7). A wide variety of other community based organizations make up the
remaining 36% of NCIs. This diverse category includes housing cooperatives, civic
organizations, community and economic development corporations, etc.12

[Table 7 about here]

Although the field as a whole includes NCIs, many FBCO groups do not. Forty-three
percent of FBCO groups have no NCIs as members. But for those who do have NCIs in
membership (57% of all FBCO groups), on average these institutions constitute about 18% of
the group’s membership, a fairly significant proportion.
FBCO groups tend to specialize in type of NCI in membership, either union or school, for
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example, but not typically both. About 13% of FBCOs have at least one union in membership,
while a very small percentage have more than three unions in their membership. About 24%
have schools as members, and some have sizeable school membership. Over 11% of faith-based
organizations have more than five schools in their membership.
We can conclude that just over half of FBCO groups work to forge ties between faith and
nonfaith institutions within their organizations in a significant way. In most of these cases,
nonfaith institutions make up a significant enough part of the membership of the groups, so that
connections between faith and non-faith based institutions appears significant.
Nonfaith institutions, however, often participate in FBCO in ways other than formal
membership. If we broaden our lens to consider the role of secular based institutions as nonmember collaborators in faith-based organizing, then labor unions, universities, community
colleges, and public schools all figure prominently in local area collaborations.
The directors of 40% of the FBCO organizations surveyed reported working with labor
unions. These ties varied from transitory links to substantial collaborative efforts. In addition to
working with Central Labor Councils and state federations affiliated with the AFL-CIO,
faith-based groups collaborated with a wide variety of individual local unions, including the
unions of teachers, farm workers, public employees, and construction workers.. Several work
with the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and their Justice for Janitors program.
FBCO directors varied in their stance toward these collaborations with labor, with some
expressing strong appreciation. For example, one respondent reported:
Labor collaboration has been very positive and fruitful. [Local labor council] has
been impacted culturally by their relationship with us in terms of their operation
of meetings, [which are now] shorter, more on time, have relational components.
This has changed labor’s vision of "church people". We worked together with [a
labor local] to create a training program for workers that recruits trainees from
our institutions. Church leaders from our organization are beginning to become
actively involved in supporting labor organizing campaigns.
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Those FBCO organizers less convinced of the benefits of collaborating with labor unions
generally focused on the contrasting cultures of the two forms of organizing:
The negative [in working with unions] is also organizational culture; they’re more into
mobilizing people than organizing people, tend to be more staff-driven than leaderdriven, like we are. They’ll have all these business reps that operate like our leaders, but
are paid staff.

One respondent offered this observation on the benefits of faith-labor collaboration:
When you mix labor and church people, the labor folks are clear that they’re
about people’s incomes and standards of living. They bring that consciousness
into the mix, help church people come down from the heavens, to see what people
really are living, the nitty-gritty. Church folks are good on what else is happening
in these people’s life, it’s not JUST about money, but also the schools in the
neighborhood [and other issues]. It’s the mixing of union and church that has all
kinds of benefits.

Thus, collaborative relationships between FBCO and labor are quite diverse; it is
possible that this is an arena of significant potential growth, offering the opportunity to
expand both FBCO’s and labor’s influence. However, taking advantage of this potential
is likely to require extensive work and mutual learning, in order to build bridges between
very different organizational cultures.
Beyond labor, respondents reported an array of contacts or collaborative
relationships with non-member organizations too varied to be reasonably grouped. The
most common of these were public schools, parent-teacher associations, and other groups
connected to schools. A large number of FBCO groups throughout the country reported
working with education-related groups. This work addressed a wide array of issues:
reducing class size, providing all-day kindergarten, creating school-to-work transition
programs for high school students, eliminating institutional discrimination against
children of immigrants, providing a safer school environment, and increasing funding to
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public libraries.
Overall, the respondents saw collaborative relationships as potential sources of
real benefits to their organizations, but they noted that the work necessary to create these
collaborations entailed the risk of wasting precious time, energy, and limited resources.
For example, one respondent reported:
Collaborations broaden our base, and bring some expertise
on deeper issues that we can't get ourselves, like economic
development. But often they don't understand our model.
There's some tension around how we approach action.
[Other organizations often] don’t like our conflict
orientation, don't understand it. Also, our most precious
resource is our leaders' time, and these kinds of
collaborations, if we don't do them well, can squander that.
So we have to evaluate the pros and cons of each one...
You can't never [sic] collaborate, there are too many
benefits to it, but you can't collaborate blindly, either.

Summarizing this review of bridging ties, it is fair to characterize FBCO groups
as follows: They are highly diverse racially, certainly at the national level but also
generally within their local organizing arenas. They are relatively diverse religiously,
though within a fairly constricted religious universe made up of the Catholic, liberal-tomoderate Protestant, and historic African-American denominations. FBCO groups
incorporate a small but locally-significant presence of Jews and Unitarian Universalists,
and rather little representation of conservative Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists,
Mormons, and other minority religions. The groups show quite variable diversity in their
organizational base, with some quite specifically based in religious congregations and
others including significant participation from labor unions, public schools, community
organizations, and other institutions.
Based upon this review, we conclude that FBCO generates new bridging social
capital within American civil society in a number of ways: by fostering inter-
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congregational, inter-denominational, and interfaith links between religious
congregations; by building inter-racial ties between racial and ethnic communities often
isolated or in competition with each other; and by linking faith-based and secular
institutions. Such bridging social capital may well of itself constitute a vital contribution
to the long-term development of a more democratic American political culture. But its
impact will be greatest if FBCO groups mobilize these social capital resources to project
power in the public sphere. If they can effectively connect their base in civil society
organizations with governmental institutions, then they might contribute to overcoming
what we have termed the structural fragmentation of the public sphere. We now turn to a
consideration of this question.

VI. Projecting Power in the Public Sphere:
Directly assessing the actual impact of individual political groups in their local
public arena involves intensive on-site research into the power dynamics and the makeup of government coalitions in that location. In turn, fully assessing the role of FBCO as
a whole field – i.e. in local and statewide public arenas around the country – would
require a large number of similarly-designed case studies of a representative sample of
organizations. Though we have strong case studies of individual FBCO efforts (op cit.),
they are not necessarily representative of the field, nor similarly-designed. In the absence
of such a study, we instead strive here to indirectly assess FBCO intervention in the
public sphere by analyzing its mobilization capacity and the kinds of issues it addresses,
and by drawing on the case studies that do exist.
Leadership participation figures provide a starting point: Over an eighteen-month
period, FBCO as a field drew 24,000 people into a significant leadership role – defined
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by the survey respondents as “core leaders” actively involved in day-to-day organizing
efforts. Typically, these core leaders come from member institutions (most often religious
congregations, but also labor unions, schools, and community organizations), from which
other participants are also drawn. Some 2,700 of these core leaders were sufficiently
involved in high-level decision-making for respondents to identify them as “board
members” – itself designating a variety of roles, but usually involving some degree of
long-term strategic planning for their organizations. Meanwhile, some 1,600 key leaders,
or those envisioned by their local organizers as future leaders, attended multiple-day,
network-sponsored national events that train leaders in the core principles and strategies
of the faith-based organizing model. Finally, the field employs some 460 full-time
professional organizers.
These numbers suggest at least some potential for FBCO to play a significant role
in the public sphere. But we need to have some measure of the degree to which FBCO
organizations actualize that potential in their local political arenas. As a measure of the
extent to which FBCO groups can project power in these arenas, we took the highest
reported attendance at a political action sponsored by respondent organizations (each of
which reported attendance at its three largest public actions for the 18-month period prior
to the 1999 interviews). Though raw numbers such as these do not directly measure these
organizations’ full political capacity (in the sense of their ability to project power into the
public sphere), they are a rough measure of one key determinant of that capacity: their
mobilizing capacity. These maximum attendance figures for the 100 respondent
organizations totaled slightly over 100,000;13 more relevant here, they grouped into the
following categories:
[Table 8 about here]
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We interpret these data as follows: in virtually any city in the country, an
organization that can mobilize more than 1,000 people to a public action with a focused
agenda and reasonably skilled leadership can be expected to have powerful influence
upon local political decision-making at least on some issues; about a quarter of FBCO
organizations report this level of political capacity. Organizations with the political
capacity to mobilize many hundred supporters around a focused policy agenda can
likewise be expected to carry significant influence upon local political decision-making;
more than a third of FBCO organizations report this level of political capacity. We would
expect the political capacities of groups mobilizing up to a few hundred supporters to
depend greatly on other factors, most notably the solidity or fractured quality of local
governing coalitions, the organization’s ability to garner support from other
organizations, skillful organizational leadership, and other facets of political opportunity.
It also presumably depends simply on the size of the local polity; in a small city,
mobilizing 200 supporters may give an organization significant local political influence.
Just over one third of FBCO groups have this more conditional political power. These
data suggest – though they do not prove – that most FBCO organizations are capable of
projecting quite significant influence up into the decision-making processes in municipal
governments and into local political society.
We gain further evidence in this regard by considering the kinds of issues faithbased organizing addresses. In the survey, lead organizers were asked an open-ended
question regarding “what kind of issues” their organizations had addressed in the last two
years. We group their responses into the following broad categories:
Education/Schools:

Public school reform, after-school programs, teacher home
visits, site-based management, reading in schools, in-school
suspension policy, tutoring, charter schools, safe schools
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Economics:

Housing:

Policing:

Healthcare:
Race relations:
Public finances:

Environment:
Social services:

Economic development, living wages, human development
tax, worker rights, workforce development, immigration
rights, first source hiring, sweatshops, minority hiring
Affordable housing, senior housing, colonias (poverty
housing in border states; mostly work on deed conversion,
water access, and waste removal)
Community policing, gang violence, drugs and crime,
anti-police-abuse, more police presence, restorative justice,
gun control, police relations
Expanded access to healthcare for children, working
families and immigrants; public health infrastructure
Anti-racism, interracial understanding, anti-hate crime
legislation, anti-KKK
Bond issues (public school support, colonia infrastructure),
banking (mostly community reinvestment act), tax-based
sharing, equalization
Environmental clean-up, anti-nuclear work, Superfund
Long-term care for seniors, welfare rights, senior services

The most common issues cited were those involving public schools, the economy,
policing, and housing. What this list does not communicate is the scale on which
contemporary faith-based organizing addresses these issues. Considerable work occurs
around relatively small-scale issues like street repair and neighborhood safey. Such
"bread and butter" issues were the staple diet of community organizing for many years;
they continue to be used to help new groups experience some early success, develop new
leaders' skills, and sometimes significantly affect the quality of life in neighborhoods.
However, many organizers have long recognized that such work does little or nothing to
address the social structures and policies that largely determine the quality of life for
working families. Their goal now is to win on issues that generate institutional reform,
and in the process to accumulate greater power within their organizations. Such work can
help to strengthen civil society in ways that will foster democratic power in the future.
The issue areas reported by FBCO groups suggest that their political influence
may indeed be focused on structural issues affecting large numbers of people – at least,
phrases such as “public school reform,” “economic development,” “living wages,”
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“worker rights,” “”immigration rights,” “minority hiring,” “colonias,” “access to
healthcare,” and “public health infrastructure” might plausibly refer to such structural
reform efforts. While these issue areas are vague enough that they might instead
represent low-level work requiring only a minor degree of political power, we know from
case studies that many FBCOs indeed engage in structural reform (Hart 2001; McRoberts
2003; Osterman 2003; Warren 2001; Wood 2002). Since scholars have tended to research
the more successful and advanced cases of FBCO, their findings should be interpreted
not as representative samples of the field’s political influence, but rather as showing the
field’s general potential.
Case studies of faith-based organizing in Texas and California are especially
illuminating here. FBCO has attained some of its most significant influence in these
populous, politically-influential states. In Texas, eleven local organizations in the
Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) network have worked together since the early eighties
to influence policy at the state level (Warren 2001). In its early campaigns, the Texas IAF
led a drive to establish the state’s first consumer counsel for public utilities and then
provided the grass-roots muscle to push the legislature to adopt a $2.8 billion increase in
funding to poor schools as part of a broader education reform package. The IAF network
proceeded to win a $70 million indigent health care package of state aid to counties,
representing the first time the state of Texas had made a commitment to provide health
services for the poor. In the late eighties, the Texas IAF won a $100 million state bond
package to fund water and sewer services for the colonias, America’s equivalent of
shanty-towns along the border with Mexico. In 1990 the network brought 10,000
members from across Texas to its official founding convention. In the nineties, the state
network moved to launch more sophisticated reform programs, featuring an Alliance
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Schools initiative with the state department of education that involved IAF in parental
and community organizing at over 100 schools across the state. By the late nineties, the
Texas IAF had spread its networks to affiliates across the southwest, and began to
coordinate strategy regionally. In the fall of 1999, six thousand members attended a
convention in San Antonio to celebrate “twenty-five years of organizing in the
southwest.” The IAF took the occasion to unveil its human development program, a new
initiative that attempts to place a unifying umbrella over the wide array of issues the
regional network addresses across the region: job training, living wage ordinances,
school reform and after-school programs, citizenship classes and voter registration, health
care and neighborhood safety.
In California, the Pacific Institute for Community Organization (PICO) faithbased organizing efforts in 18 cities have since 1997 collaborated on the “PICO
California Project,”working to knit together a vehicle for political influence on statewide
issues (Wood 2001, 2002). Initial efforts focused on public school improvements and
resulted in $50 million in new after-school programs, many in poor school districts or
individual schools located in poor areas. The California Project also played a key role in
a successful 1998 bond initiative that provided $9.2 billion for new school construction
and repairs. In 1999, the organizations gained $15 million in direct state funding for a
new program of home visits by teachers in 400 public schools; this program has
subsequently been refunded annually and become a national model for closing the gap in
parental involvement between middle class and poor/working class parents. In May 2000,
the organizations turned their attention to health care access, organizing a multiracial
gathering in Sacramento of 3,000 people from across the state. They gathered to push for
state-sponsored health insurance for the working poor who did not qualify for Medicaid
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but held no private insurance (some 7 million Californians) as well as for some 1.5
million California children qualified for state coverage but unenrolled due to
cumbersome procedures and poor information. They gained the public endorsement of
the heads of both houses of the California state legislature and, after a great deal of
conflictive political work to overcome opposition to any new entitlement programs, the
endorsement of Governor Gray Davis. As of this writing, they have won $50 million in
new funding to clinics (which provide most health care for indigent Californians) and got
the legislature to establish a new state insurance program for the working poor. Although
funding for the latter was postponed until 2003 due to the costs of the California energy
crisis and lost revenue from a weakening economy, the PICO-led effort appears to be on
track to become the largest single expansion of health care access in decades.
The Texas and California efforts – as well as strong or emerging statewide and
regional efforts in Arizona, Minnesota, Louisiana, Florida, Maryland, New England,
Colorado, and the upper Midwest – demonstrate that faith-based organizing can attain a
powerful role in the public sphere in large political arenas. In these and other locations,
the role of FBCO has included both influencing policy-making within government and
forging partnerships with key institutional leaders in political society.
A similar pattern holds in the more local work of strong individual FBCO
organizations operating within local political arenas: by combining sometimes-conflictive
political engagement and more collaborative partnerships with key leaders in political
society (both elected officials and non-elected institutional leaders), these organizations
have sometimes become influential players in local decision-making and agenda-setting.
The strongest FBCO groups hold preponderant influence in the local committees that
control expenditures of federally-funded Community Development Block Grants, meet
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with incoming mayors to set priorities, and foster significant policy initiatives on
housing, education, immigrant rights, medical care, and economic development. Where
this occurs, FBCO groups become the kind of democratic bridging institutions we
discussed above, linking civil society, political society, and state levels of the public
sphere.
VII. Conclusion
Beyond the sheer size and geographic scope of the field of faith-based organizing
(which the national survey reported here documents for the first time), we argue for its
analytic importance based on the evidence we have reviewed on the field’s role as a
"bridging institution" that generates significant democratic impact. "Democratic impact"
here includes political participation by previously-marginalized constituencies,
substantive egalitarian outcomes, and the forging of upward institutional linkages from
civil society into political society and the state. Together, these allow low- and moderateincome social sectors to represent their interests in the deliberative settings that
determine the distribution of societal resources. In the process, these social sectors begin
to overcome their own political marginalization and resist the forces of colonization that
would exploit them purely in the service of elite interests. In this role as democratic
bridging institutions, FBCO organizations thus begin to address a fundamental
institutional crisis of the modern American polity, what we termed above the structural
fragmentation of the public sphere.
As articulated originally by Habermas (1989 [1962]) and elaborated more
recently by a variety of scholars (see especially Cohen and Arato 1992 and the chapter by
Benhabib in Calhoun 1992), the concept of “public sphere” – despite its historical origins
in efforts by the bourgeoisie to advance its narrow interests – offers important analytic
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leverage for understanding the prospects and challenges of broader democratic projects.
In particular, fragmentation of the public sphere places obstacles before all contemporary
democratic projects; offering one model for how to overcome this fragmentation by
forging new vertical linkages within the public sphere represents an important
contribution of faith-based organizing today.
FBCO makes an important democratic contribution when it helps communities
alienated from political decision-making to organize, represent themselves, and generate
the power necessary to compete with other interests in political society. To the extent
that the public sphere is more inclusive, it is likely to perform its democratic function
more successfully.14 But such vertical linkages alone are not sufficient to revitalize the
public sphere in a society that is becoming increasingly fractured horizontally into
isolated and sometimes antagonistic communities of identity (Gitlin 1995). In such a
society, the public sphere can well become a cacophony of separate interest groups, each
leveraging power for its own narrowly conceived interests.
Thus, for democracy to thrive, the public sphere must also draw social groups
beyond their own particularistic "identities." This is not to say the public sphere must
generate consensus, but it must provide a forum for discussing a shared societal future
and taking action together, thus broadening social identities. When people have active
connections to each other, they tend to become more tolerant and to increase their
awareness of how their fates are linked. Generally, social capital and tolerance are
strongly associated (Putnam 2000, p. 356-7). Bridging social capital that brings people
together who are different from each other can therefor play an important role in forging
broader identities and sense of the common good. Yet, as we discussed in the
introductory section, bridging social capital is in short supply in American society.
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In this context, faith-based organizing offers a second important contribution to
constituting a more democratic society. By linking individuals and institutions across
religious and racial barriers and the divides that often separate faith-based from secular
social institutions, FBCO generates significant new bridging social capital. The religious
right remains overwhelmingly white, heavily evangelical, and largely fails to promote the
socio-economic interests of low-income Americans. By contrast, the civic and political
engagement of religious communities fostered by FBCO is multi-racial, significantly
interfaith, and active in pursuit of a broad set of socio-economic issues.
The two contributions of FBCO are, in fact, linked. Its role as a bridging
institution comes from the field’s ability to project power within the public sphere. Yet
the elements of that power – leadership development, mobilizing capacity, issue work,
and alliance building – are dependent upon the field’s social capital base. That is, FBCO's
ability to project power publicly is a function of its access to the bonding social capital
embedded in its member congregations and institutions, as well as its ability to build
bridging social capital by linking institutions to one another.
In creating bridging institutions, in forging bridging social capital, and in the
sheer scale of its issue work, FBCO thus carries real democratic promise for American
society – albeit with significant limitations and ambiguities.15 At present, there is nothing
to suggest that it has the political vision or social depth to lead a thoroughgoing national
democratization project on its own; indeed, it has not begun to play a role in national
political life and has only influenced public life at the state level in a few places. But if it
continues to spread geographically, successfully replicates the more sophisticated
organizing approaches already in place, and learns from its expanding alliances with
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other sectors, faith-based organizing has the potential to become one crucial ingredient in
a broader movement for deeper democracy in America.
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1. See Wuthnow (1988) on the “restructuring” of American religion, particularly its public
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presence. Framing our discussion in the way posed here risks assuming religious participation in
public life to be illegitimate. We make so such assumption; the key question concerns the
appropriate forms of such participation. See also Wuthnow (1996) and Wuthnow and
Hodgkinson, et al. (1990).
2. Though civil society may include the private realms of family as well, we emphasize here the
organizational and associational element of civil society. Though historically the concept of
civil society developed in contrast to the realm of government, we use it in contrast to both
government and economic activity — that is, in contrast to what Habermas in The Theory of
Communicative Action calls “the Systems.” Civil society thus represents the organizational and
associational component of the Lifeworld. See also Wuthnow and Anheier (1991) and Seligman
(1995, 1997).
3. The survey was sponsored by Interfaith Funders of New York, and carried out in collaboration
with a “Scholars Group” which included the present authors, Stephen Hart, Omar McRoberts,
Janice Fine, Marshall Ganz, john powell, and Rob Kleidman.
4. The numbers of institutions have been rounded off in recognition of the fact that they are
estimates taken from survey responses. The precise figures calculated from the survey are: 4,037
total institutions, of which 3534 are congregations and 503 are non-congregational institutions.
5. The locations of FBCO groups are taken from the known universe of all groups in the field. In
everything else that follows in this paper, however, figures for the field as a whole are estimated
from the results received from the 100 groups that participated in the survey.
6. These proportions are calculated using data from the Independent Sector (1993, pp. 115-116).
The Independent Sector estimated from telephone company yellow pages that in 1992 there were
257,648 congregations in the United States. Using lists supplied by the American Church Lists,
Inc., Independent Sector gave an alternative number of 355,235 congregations.
7. The low end of the estimate assumes that congregations involved in FBCO groups are about the same
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size as the average American congregation. Most likely, though, they are larger because so many are
Catholic parishes that are quite large. The high end of the estimate comes from an estimate of the average
size of congregations involved in FBCO given by respondents to a survey conducted by Stephen Hart in
1994; see Hart (2001).

8. The comparison is illustrative but not strictly speaking correct. These scholars measure
individual membership, while we measure institutional membership. According to Skocpol,
Ganz and Munson (2000, p. 529), only 58 associations in American history have ever exceeded
the 1% threshold.
9. Three notes regarding this classification: first, because many of the “traditionalist Protestant”
congregations were Pentecostal, and due to the strong differences between the historic black
churches and the black Pentecostal tradition represented by COGIC, we classify COGIC
congregations as “traditionalist Protestant.” Second, we here classify the congregations listed by
respondents as “other (=non-Missionary) Baptist” in the historic black church category – though,
in principal, white American Baptist and Southern Baptist congregations would have been listed
this way, our years of fieldwork in this field convince us that nearly all of these are National
Baptist, Primitive Baptist, and other black baptist congregations. Finally, there were a small
number of congregations classified as “other Christian” by the respondents; we exclude these
from this analysis, as we are unable to classify them into these groups. From other information,
we believe most of these to be non-denominational evangelical churches; if so, they would
increase the religious diversity reported here.
10. We note that, as reflected in the above quote, at least two strategies exist for handling
religious diversity. One strategy encourages participants to speak strongly from their own
traditions, with other participants translating this into their own faith languages. Another strategy
is to ask all participants to pray in neutral terms that seek to avoid any language that is not
acceptable in other traditions. The former strategy places a burden on everyone to learn
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something about others’ cultures; the latter strategy runs the risk of so diluting faith language
that it no longer “moves” participants.
11. See Warren (2001) and Wood (2002) for case studies of the experiences of FBCO groups in
trying to forge interracial cooperation.
12. This NCI category includes a small number of religious associations, but so few that it
remains legitimate to describe the connections between congregations and NCIs as faithnonfaith.
13. The purposes of these meetings, however, varied between organizations. Many, perhaps
most, have held bigger meetings. So this figure is not the highest measure of public support, but
the best figure we have. These figures probably also underestimate the political capacity of
FBCO groups that participate in statewide organizing efforts. They can often use the state
network’s political influence for local effect (Warren 2001).
14. Its political capacity will of course depend on other factors as well, including an ability to
mobilize cultural resources. Rhys Williams (1999) has shown how “common good” language
rooted in religion – though originating in hegemonic projects of dominant groups – provide
powerful cultural resources for marginalized groups as they struggle to make democratic claims
on society. Qualitative studies of FBCO (Wood 2002; Hart 2001; McRoberts 2000) suggest that
the field’s influence flows from its capacity for the democratic mobilization of religious
commitments.
15. Our argument has been shaped by Somers’ historical and theoretical analysis of citizenship
and the public sphere (see especially 1993; also 1995). In her call for “a sociology of
relationships among public spheres, community associational life, and patterns of political
culture” (1993, p. 587), she provides a strong conceptual framework that links the sociology of
the public sphere to social networks and cultural analysis. In so doing, she gives sociological
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substance to the sometimes-airy discussion of “the public sphere” understood only abstractly.

TABLES

Table 1 Characteristics of all FBCO organizations
(all figures are percentages except where noted)
Geographic location of organization, by region
Midwest
Mountain
Northeast
Pacific
South
Southwest Central
Year founded - first hired organizer (mean)
Number of member institutions (mean)
Number of member congregations (mean)
Size of board of directors (mean)
Number of core leaders (two months; mean)
Income (median)a
Expenses (median) a

26.0
6.7
21.3
17.9
12.5
15.6
1991.3
30.35
26.57
20.22
177.82
$150,000
$149,898

a. Limited to ca ses with valid data on sources of income
Regions defined as follows:
Northeast:
Midwest:
Pacific:
Mountain:
South:
Southwest Central:

MN, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, PN, DE, MD, DC
OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NE, KS
WA, OR, CA, AK, HW
MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ, UT, NV
VI, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL, KT, TN, AL, MS
AK, LO, OK, TX

Table 2 Characteristics of FBCO organizations
(all figures are percentages)
Characteristic

Percentage of FBCO groups

Year founded - first hired organizer
1972-1979
1980-1984
1985-1989
1990-1994
1995-1999

7.7
8.4
12.5
30.4
41.1

Number of organizers on st aff
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

29.1
26.9
19.7
11.6
6.5
2.7
0.9
2.5

Number of member institutions
Less than 10
10-14
15-19
20-29
30-39
40-69
70-99
100-230

2.1
15.4
19.8
31.2
17.1
11.1
0.0
3.3

Member inst itutions consist of congregations only

43.6

Number of core leaders (participants over 2 months)
10-19
20-39
40-59
60-99
100-149
150-199
200-249
250-299
300-1300

3.2
11.7
15.9
9.2
14.1
10.2
10.7
11.8
13.2

Table 3: Religious Characteristics of member institutions for all FBCOs combined
(all figures are percentages)

Percentage of all member institutions that are:
Congregations
87.5
Noncongregational institutions (NCIs) 12.5
Percentage of member congregations that is:
Jewish
1.95
Unitarian Universalist
2.09
Other non-Christian
0.62
Catholic
32.92
Episcopalian
6.54
Lutheran
7.89
Presbyterian
5.71
UCC
3.52
United Methodist
8.90
Other Protestant
0.83
AME, CME, AME Zion
2.70
Missionary Baptist
1.49
COGIC
2.16
Other Black Protestant
1.49
Baptist (non-Missionary)
14.81
Theologically Conservative Protestant
2.84
Other Christian
3.52

Table 4: Religious Diversity within Local Faith-Based Organizations
Number (N = 93)

Main patterns within this category

3

All Roman Catholic

Dominant
>60% one group

13

7 Roman Catholic dominant
4 Mainline Protestant dominant
2 historic Black Church do minant

Majority
50-60% one group

11

4 Roman Catholic majority
5 Mainline Protestant majority
2 historic Black Protestant majority

35

20 Catholic/Mainline
9 historic Black/Mainline
4 Catholic/historic Black
1 traditionalist/historic Black
1 Mainline/non-Christian

31

9 with largest group Mainline
9 with largest group Catholic
4 with largest group Historic Black
9 with two essentially equal primary groups
(mostly historic Black, Mainline, or Catholic)

Monoreligious
100% one group

Bireligious
2 groups > 20%

Diverse
3 groups >20%
or
4 groups > 15%

Religious categories defined as follows:
monoreligious:
all congregations from one religious group
dominant:
more than 60%, but less than 100%, of congregations from one religious group
majority:
50-60% of congregations from one religious group
bireligious:
more than 20% of congregations from each of two religious groups, but none more than
50%
diverse:
more than 20% of congregations from each of three religious groups, or more than 15%
of congregations from each of four religious groups

Table 5: Racial characteristics for all FBCOs combined
(all figures are percentages)
Percentage of member institutions
that is predominant ly:
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Native American
White/Anglo
Interracial
Immigrant (of various race)
Percentage of boards of directors
that is:
Asian
Black
Hispanic
Native American
White/Anglo
Interracial
that is:
Male
Female

1.29
35.03
20.89
0.22
36.06
6.49
10.81

2.31
31.73
21.05
0.47
43.36
1.07
48.73
51.27

:

Table 6: Racial diversity within local faith based organizations
Number (N = 82)

Patterns within this category*

Monoracial
(100% one group)

9

3 White
3 Black
3 Hispanic

Racially dominant
(one group >80%)

4

2 White dominanta
2 Black dominant

Racial majority
(65%-80% one
group)

21

14 White dominant b
6 Black dominant c
1 Hispanic dominant d

22 White/Blacke
8 White/Hispanic
3 Black/Hispanic
2 White/Asian

Biracial
(only 2 groups
>15%)

35

Multiracial
(3 or 4 groups >15%)

9 with 3 groups >15%

9 White/Black/Hispanic f

2 with 4 groups >15%

1 White/Black/Hispanic/Asiang

____________
*Note: Secondary group listed when >=10%
a
Listed as dominant/secondary group, the patterns are: 1 white/Hispanic, 1 white/black & interracial, and 2 Black/white
b
Listed as dominant/secondary group, the patterns are: 6 White/Black, 3 White/Hispanic, 2 White/Black & Hispanic, 2 White/Black &
Interracial, and 1 White/Interracial
c
Listed as dominant/secondary group, the patterns are: 3 Black/White, 1 Black/Hispanic, and 2 Black/White & Interracial
d
Listed as dominant/secondary group, the pattern is: 1 Hispanic/White
e
Listed in order of concentration: 12 Black/White, 10 White/Black, 4 White/Hispanic, 4 Hispanic/White, 3 Black/Hispanic, 1 White/Asian, and
1 Asian/White
f
Listed in order of concentration: 3 Black/White/Hispanic, 2 White/Black/Hispanic, 2 Black/Hispanic/White, 1 White/Hispanic/Black, and
1Hispanic/Black/White. Groups include Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American and White. Interracial group excluded from analysis. If groups
had equal proportions, then listed in alphabetical order.
g
Listed in order of concentration: 1 Asian/Black/Hispanic/White and 1 White/Hispanic/Asian/Black. If groups had equal proportions, then listed
in alphabetical order.
Note: two cases were indeterminate: 1 in which 11 of the 12 participating groups were interracial; 1 in which 50% of the participating groups
were white and 43% were interracial.

Table 7 Characteristics of noncongregational institutions (NCIs) for all FBCOs combined
(all figures are percentages)
Percentage of all NCIs that are:
Unions
Schools
Neighborhood associations
Other community organizations

14.84
42.48
6.65
36.03

Table 8: Projecting Power: Highest attendance at political actions sponsored by local organizations:
Maximum reported attendance
at a local political action

Number of FBC O organizations
(n = 100)

1,000 or more
(max = 10,000; mean = 1,807)

27 organizations

400-900

36 organizations

120-350

28 organizations

less than 100

9 organizations

